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 November 6, 1996 
 
 Before: BECKER, McKEE and GARTH, 
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 Muhammad Askari appeals the sentence imposed by the 
district court for his bank robbery conviction on the grounds 
that the court erred in refusing to grant a downward departure 
for diminished capacity under § 5K2.13 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Askari rests his argument on the facts that the 
unarmed bank robbery was non-violent and that he has a well-
documented history of serious psychiatric illness.   





bank robbery is not at issue.  Indeed, prior to his sentencing, 
the district court found that Askari was not mentally competent, 
and committed him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) to a federal 
institution for psychiatric care and treatment.1  After the 
warden at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at 
Springfield, Missouri, certified that Askari had recovered and 
was again mentally competent, the court sentenced him to 210 
months in prison, to be followed by three years supervised 
release.  
 The facts regarding the bank robbery are also not at 
issue.  On April 23, 1992, Askari walked into the First Bank of 
Philadelphia at 1424 Walnut Street shortly after 2:00 p.m.  He  
went to a closed teller's window and said two or three times, 
"Put the money on the counter."  He then went to the window where 
bank teller Ellie Ishizaki was working and said, "You have three 
seconds to give me the money."  Ishizaki gave him bait money.  
Askari then took the money and ran out the door.  The tellers did 
                     
1.  Dr. Edward Guy examined Askari to assess whether he was 
competent to stand trial.  Dr. Guy initially concluded that 
Askari was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia in partial 
remission, drug addiction, and seizure disorder.  However, he 
still concluded that Askari was competent to stand trial.  
Following a second psychiatric evaluation before Askari's 
sentencing, Dr. Guy testified that Askari was not competent.  
Noting Askari's "history of serious mental illness," Dr. Guy 
found that Askari was too delusional to be able to cooperate with 
his attorney.  The district court then ordered that Askari be 
committed.  After two years of treatment at the U.S. Medical 
Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, Askari was 
diagnosed as suffering from "Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type 
currently in remission with antipsychotic medication."  The 
report noted that Askari initially "exhibited delusional thinking 
and auditory hallucinations" which improved with medication.  The 





not see Askari carrying any weapon, and Askari did not use any 
force or make any verbal threats to harm anyone.  He did, 
however, have his hand underneath his shirt.  Two bank employees 
together with a Center City Special District employee chased 
Askari.  They caught him on the 1400 block of Locust Street.  
Police later found the bait money in Askari's pants.  They did 
not recover a weapon.   
 At sentencing, defense counsel argued for a downward 
departure based on Askari's mental illness.  The court refused to 
grant the departure.  First, the court ruled: 
I cannot depart downward for diminished capacity at the 
time of the offense based on the guidelines 
as I read them.  They at least contain a 
policy statement that a downward departure 
for diminished capacity is limited to non 
violent offenses. 
 
 * * *  
 
-- you're doing it [requesting a downward departure] 
against the backdrop of a commission that 
says no downward departure for diminished 
capacity at the time of the offense, if the 
offense is a violent crime. 
The court then went on to reject counsel's motion for a downward 
departure based on unusual mitigating circumstances not 
adequately considered by the guidelines.  Finding that the 
guideline range was 210 to 240 months, the court imposed a 
sentence of 210 months in prison. 
 Askari's contention on appeal is that his unarmed bank 
robbery was a non-violent offense because he did not use any 
force or violence, verbally threaten anyone, or hurt anyone 





suffered from diminished mental capacity.  He had a long history 
of serious psychiatric illness and was diagnosed as paranoid  
schizophrenic.  In Askari's submission, the court should have 
ruled that it had authority to depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 
5K2.13, which permits downward departures for diminished capacity 
if the defendant committed a "non-violent offense." 
 The district court, nevertheless, was quite correct in 
its holding.  In United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d 
Cir. 1990), we held that the district court did not have the 
authority in a bank robbery sentence to depart downward because 
that offense is not a "non-violent offense."  We so concluded by 
looking to a separate guidelines provision, § 4B1.2, which 
defines robbery as a "crime of violence."  Although the circuits 
are split on this point, we are bound by our prior holding.  
Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.2 
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2.  Four other circuits have reached the same conclusion that 
this court reached in Rosen.  United States v. Mazotte, 76 F.3d 
887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 
591-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (6-5 decision); United States v. 
Maddaleny, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989).  However, two circuits, 
following Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Poff, have 
concluded that the "non-violent offense" requirement of § 5K2.13 
is not governed by the "crime of violence" definition contained 
in § 4B1.2.  United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 






Becker, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
 Because of our decision in Rosen, and the constraints 
imposed on me by our internal operating procedures, I join the 
opinion and judgment of the court.  I write separately because I 
believe that our decision in Rosen, that a downward departure is 
not available under §5K2.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines in 
relation to a crime, the commission of which involves no violence 




 Our discussion of the issue in Rosen was brief: 
Defendant contends that his crime was, in fact, non-violent 
because it did not involve physical force.  Crimes of 
violence, however, include situations where force is 
threatened but not used.  In other contexts, crimes of 
violence have been defined as offenses that have “as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force. . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988) (emphasis 
added); see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment. (N.1).  
Defendant would have us conclude that § 5K2.13's use of 
the term “non-violent” means something other than the 
opposite of a crime of violence. 
  
 We can find no support for such a contention and 
therefore find no error in the district court’s 
determination that defendant’s crime was not “non-
violent.”  See United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91 
(9th Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Poff, 723 F.Supp. 
79 (N.D. Ind. 1989).  Consequently, guideline § 5K2.13 
does not authorize a downward departure for this 
defendant’s mental condition. 
 
United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 The linchpin of Rosen, which I believe the panel 
accepted uncritically, is the proposition that the definition of 





offender provision, governs the meaning of "non-violent offense" 
in § 5K2.13.  But the Rosen panel did not have the benefit of the 
arguments so incisively made by Judge Easterbrook, in his 
dissenting opinion in United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593-96 
(7th Cir. 1991) (en banc), which have subsequently been adopted 
by the D.C. and Fourth Circuits.  See United States v. Weddle, 30 
F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 
1446, 1450-52 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  These three opinions have 
explained why the definition of "crime of violence" contained in 
the career offender provision does not govern the meaning of § 
5K2.13, and have concluded that a sentencing court "must consider 
all the facts and circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
crime is a 'non-violent offense.'"  Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1453; 
see Poff, 926 F.2d at 594-96; Weddle, 30 F.3d at 540.  I find 
these arguments, which I shall outline briefly, to be wholly 
persuasive.  I also add some of my own. 
 
B.   
 I perforce begin with a description of the applicable 
Guidelines provisions.  Section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines 
provides: 
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering 
from significantly reduced mental capacity not 
resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other 
intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to 
reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
contributed to the commission of the offense, provided 
that the defendant’s criminal history does not indicate 






Section 5K2.13 does not define “violent” or “non-violent.”  The 
only related definition contained in the guidelines is that found 
in the Career Offender Section, § 4B1.2: 
(1)The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal 
or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year that -- 
 
  (i)has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against 
the person of another, or 
 
  (ii)is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, 
or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. 
 
The commentary to this section recites:  
 
2."Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, 
aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, 
robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension 
of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.  Other 
offenses are included where (A) that offense has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth 
(i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which 
the defendant was convicted involved use of 
explosives (including any explosive material or 
destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.  Under this section, the conduct of which 
the defendant was convicted is the focus of 
inquiry. 
 
The term "crime of violence" does not include the offense of 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.  
Where the instant offense is the unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon, §2K2.1 
(Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation 
of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions 
Involving Firearms or Ammunition) provides an 
increase in offense level if the defendant has one 
or more prior felony convictions for a crime of 
violence or controlled substance offense; and, if 
the defendant is sentenced under the provisions of 








 The position adopted in Rosen may be seen in its best 
light through the lens of Judge Flaum, in his opinion for the 
six-five en banc Poff majority of the Seventh Circuit.  Judge 
Flaum argues that, because the “Guidelines should be read as a 
whole"; because the root word employed in both provisions is the 
same; and because § 4B1.2 does not limit its definition of 
“crimes of violence” to situations involving a career offender, 
the definition of “crimes of violence” in § 4B1.2 must govern the 
meaning of “violent offense” in § 5K2.13. Poff, 926 F.2d at 591. 
To hold otherwise, he reasons, would result in an absurdity, for 
a crime could constitute both a “crime of violence” and a “non-
violent offense.”3  Id. 
 
                     
     3Judge Flaum rejects Poff’s contention that the Commission’s 
failure to define “non-violent offense” in § 5K2.13 suggests that 
“the Commission meant different things by `violent offense’ and 
`crime of violence.’” He observes that:  
 
[c]ourts often say that the choice of different words reflects an 
intent to say something different.  See, e.g., 
Zabielski v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 919 F.2d 1276, 1279 
(7th Cir. 1990).  But here the Commission used the same 
word -- “violence.”  True, in one case it used a 
negative construction -- “non-violent” -- and in the 
other case used a prepositional phrase containing the 
noun “violence” as a modifier rather than using the 
simpler adjective “violent” -- but the root, and 
meaning, are the same in both cases. . . . “[A] rather 
heavy load rests on him who would give different 
meanings to the same word or the same phrase when used 
a plurality of times in the same Act . . . .”  United States v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369, 377 (9th Cir. 
1945).  Appellant cannot meet that burden by asking us 
to tease meaning from the Commissions’s use of a 
prepositional phrase rather than an adjective.   





 Judge Flaum finds further support for his position in 
the Armed Career Offender provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924, which 
defines “the term `violent felony’ to include any crime that has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another, 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(i), a definition that mirrors that of ‘crime of 
violence’ in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and in § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines.”  
Poff, 926 F.2d at 592.  Because little discernible difference 
separates a “violent felony” and a “violent offense,” Judge Flaum 
concludes that “had the Commission desired to distinguish among 
types of violence, it would have expanded its vocabulary.  At a 
minimum, it would have offered a technical definition for each 
term.”  Id. 
 Judge Flaum draws additional strength for his 
interpretation from his perception of the Commission’s policy 
choices: 
The Guidelines reflect the view that those who have a history of 
crimes of violence merit increased incarceration, and 
include those, like appellant, who have threatened 
violence in that category of defendants.  In addition 
to limiting the authority of courts to decrease the 
sentences of defendants with reduced mental capacity to 
cases in which the defendant committed a non-violent 
offense, § 5K2.13 further circumscribed the authority 
of courts to depart on this basis by adding the proviso 
that “the defendant’s criminal history does not 
indicate a need for incarceration to protect the 
public.”  Career offenders, by definition, fail to meet 
this condition.   
Id. 
 
Under this view, even if a “crime of violence” and a “non-violent 
offense” were not mutually exclusive, § 5K2.13 would not 





did not govern the meaning of a “non-violent offense,” then a 
defendant could require additional incarceration because of his 
criminal history under § 4B1.2 and less incarceration because of 
the same history under § 5K2.13, an interpretation that Judge 
Flaum found to be so “illogical and inconsistent” that it could 




 Much of Judge Flaum's opinion is couched in terms of 
linguistic analysis; however, I find such analysis ultimately 
unhelpful in resolving this difficult issue.  While “crimes of 
violence” and “non-violent offense” employ the same root word, 
the phrases “readily may take meanings other than as opposites.” 
 Poff, 929 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  More 
importantly, the distinct objectives of the two provisions at 
issue - § 4B1.2 and § 5K2.13 - counsel that the meaning of the 
former not govern that of the latter.   
 When it employed the phrase “crime of violence” in § 
4B1.2, the Sentencing Commission crafted a term of art intended 
to identify repeat offenders who deserve a longer sentence than 
others who have committed the same offense.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
994(h).  Longer sentences for these “career offenders” are 
“justified by the purposes of incarceration, as set out in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988) and discussed in the Introductory 
Commentary to Part A of Chapter 4 of the Guidelines.”  Chatman, 





culpable than a first time offender and, therefore, deserves 
greater punishment.  Moreover, longer sentences “guarantee 
incapacitation of those repeat offenders whose past records 
suggest a propensity to commit violent crimes.”  Id. at 1451 
(citing 128 Cong. Rec. 26,518 (1982) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy)).   
 In an effort to address these policy concerns, the 
Commission drafted a definition of “crime of violence” that 
captures crimes involving “an unrealized prospect of violence.”  
Poff, 929 F.2d at 594.  Thus, § 4B1.2 penalizes a career offender 
for the elements of the crime for which he was charged and 
convicted and not for his actual conduct.  Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also Chatman, 986 F.2d at 
1451.  For example, courts have held that any crime that has as a 
statutory element “the threatened use of violence” constitutes a 
“crime of violence” per se, regardless of the facts surrounding 
the crime.  Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451.  In the end, then, the 
phrase “crime of violence” captures crimes that are violent in an 
“abnormal sense.”  Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting). 
 But when we consider § 5K2.13, we find that the phrase 
“non-violent offense” appears without definition and cross-
reference.  Because the Commission has not provided otherwise, we 
first look to the “ordinary legal (and lay) understanding” of a 
"non-violent offense," a definition that excludes all crimes in 
which mayhem occurs.  Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  





of violence” is not limited to situations involving career 
offenders, id. at 591, the lack of a cross-reference to § 4B1.2 
is telling.  The Guidelines often employ explicit cross-
referencing, and “[i]t would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to 
say that the judge may depart unless the defendant committed a 
`crime of violence.’”  Id. at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  
 For example, § 4A1.1, which guides computation of the 
criminal history category in the Sentencing Table, expressly 
adopts the definition of "crime of violence" set forth in § 
4B1.2.  See 1992 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(p).  Thus, the use of a 
different phrase suggests that the Sentencing Commission intended 
a different meaning.  See Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting).  Furthermore, although the Commission has recently 
amended § 4B1.2 and its commentary twice, and the controversy 
over this issue has simmered, the Commission has not suggested 
any relationship between § 5K2.13 and § 4B1.2.  See 1992 U.S.S.G. 
Appendix C 253-54, 284-85 (amendments 433, 461).  Against this 
backdrop, the Commission’s silence indicates that the provisions 
should be independently interpreted.4   
 B. 
                     
     4The Poff majority interpreted the Commission's failure to 
reference § 5K2.13 in these amendments as tacit approval of the 
conclusion that the definition in § 4B1.2 extends to § 5K2.13. 
See Poff, 926 F.2d at 593.  That position, however, rests on the 
erroneous belief that the courts of appeals have uniformly 
adopted the view espoused by the Poff majority.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing application of § 5K2.13 without mentioning § 4B1.2). 





 The significance of the absence of an explicit cross- 
reference is heightened by the obvious difference between the 
character of the downward departure provision and that of the 
career offender provision, a distinction of which the Commission 
was certainly aware.  Section 5K2.13 is a guided departure, one 
that is thus “encouraged.”  See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 
2035, 2045 (1996).  Although a § 5K2.13 departure is tied to a 
judgment as to the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
contributed to the commission of the offense, a departure is 
optional, and elements of discretion permeate the provision.   
 Plainly, a Guideline provision that encourages the 
district court to exercise discretion to depart downward is the 
obverse of the career offender provision that in essence commands 
the harshest sentence possible under the circumstances by kicking 
up both the criminal history and base offense levels.  This 
conclusion is not only buttressed but enhanced by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Koon.  While the commentators are not in 
agreement as to the sweep and import of Koon, see 9 Fed. 
Sentencing Rep. 1 (1996) (symposium on Koon), they agree that 
Koon does signal that the federal sentencing judges have greater 
discretion in the fashioning of departures than was previously 
thought.5   
                     
     5That the departure power also generally imports discretion 
is evident from the fact that unguided departures under § 5K2.0 
(where the case is outside the “heartland,” see 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b) and 1992 U.S.S.G. ch. 1 part A 5-6) require the 
sentencing judge to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) which reference the kinds of (discretionary) factors that 





 Thus, the regime of departures contemplates the 
exercise of discretion by district judges to conform sentences to 
the actual crime committed, while the career offender provisions 
require judges to assume the worst.  Indeed, in the course of 
identifying particular trends within an individual’s criminal 
history, § 4B1.2 appears to characterize as “crime[s] of 
violence” many offenses that, taken individually on their facts, 
might be interpreted as non-violent.  As Judge Easterbrook has 
put it, while “[t]he prospect of violence (the `heartland’ of the 
offense, in the guidelines' argot) sets the presumptive range;” 
when the offender causes less turmoil than expected, “departure 
is permissible.”  Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting).6   
  C. 
 In short, some factors at work in the departure 
sections of the Guidelines are in tension with those at work 
under the career offender sections, and it does not make sense to 
import a career offender-based definition of “crime of violence” 
into a departure section in the absence of a specific cross-
reference.  Rather, it is better to permit the district courts to 
consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
                     
     6As previously mentioned, Judge Flaum argues that the 
definition of “crime of violence” must govern § 5K2.13, for to 
hold otherwise would mean that a defendant could require 
additional incarceration because of his or her criminal history 
under § 4B1.2 and less incarceration because of the same history 
under § 5K2.13. Poff, 926 F.2d at 592.  But this argument fails 
to understand the distinction between punishment based on the 
conduct constituting the elements of a crime and the actual 





commission of a crime when deciding whether it qualifies as a 
non-violent offense under § 5K2.13.  This rule furthers the sound 
policy of according the district courts discretion under the 
Guidelines regime wherever possible.   
 I note too that the mere fact that the case is a bank 
robbery does not make it ineligible for a § 5K2.13 departure.  
See Chatman, supra.  I acknowledge that Askari had his hand 
underneath his shirt when he handed the teller the note.  But he 
could not have been too frightening, because two bank employees 
chased him, which is an action they surely would have forgone had 
they thought he had a gun or was otherwise armed or dangerous.  
At all events, that determination should be a matter for the 
district court.   
 For the foregoing reasons, I believe that our decision 
in Rosen should be reconsidered by the Court en banc. 
